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COST OF MONEY AS AN ELEMENT IN THE VALUA-
TION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
There never has been any question of the right of a pub-
lic utility enterprise to be reimbursed for the cost incurred in
obtaining capital funds devoted to the development and expansion
of its plant and business. After the ascertainment of the exact
cost of raising the funds used by the utility in its business, the
problem then arises as to the method by which this cost may be
equitably apportioned between the owners of and investors in the
enterprise, and the customers of the utility.
The decisions of the courts and commissions show that there
are two distinct ways in which the cost of money may be handled.
On the one hand, the expenditures incident to raising money may
be regarded as constituting an unavoidable expense in the acquisi-
tion of capital funds necessary to initiate and develop the busi-
ness, and as such properly to be considered in the same class as
the cost of professional services rendered by engineers, attorneys,
and the administrative organization of the company in connection
with the construction and development of the property; in brief,
a cost upon which a reasonable amount for interest and profit
should be earned. Thus to add the expenditures incurred in get-
ting capital funds to the total investment in the plant and hence
to consider it as an integral part of the total sum upon which a
fair rate of return should be allowed, is one way in which an
equitable arrangement may be effected between the investors and
the customers of the utility. The addition of the cost of money
to the physical property investment of the utility enlarges the
sum of money representing the value of the plant upon which a
fair return is to be allowed. The second method of treating the
cost of money is gradually to write off the original cost by
charging a sufficiently high rate to the customers immediately
following the acquisition of the capital funds invested in the
business, so that over the period of years for which the securities
run, the entire cost will be written off through operating expenses.
For example, a cost of $ioo,ooo incurred in the sale of a
$2,ooo,ooo bond issue, running for twenty years, may be extin-
guished for a public utility enterprise having five thousand cus-
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tomers by equal annual payments during the life of the bonds of
$i per customer a year, or by an increase of $5000 per annum in
the ordinary rates over and above the rates necessary to cover
operating expenses, including depreciation and reasonable amounts
for interest and profits. When amortized in this manner, the
cost of obtaining money becomes only a temporary charge against
the customers, but is shifted from all of the customers of a plant
to only that part of them attached during the period for which
the securities run. The total cost of obtaining money is thus
extinguished at the expense of those people who may be customers
during the amortization period.
Before attempting to reach any conclusions concerning the
proper method of handling the cost of money in determining the
fair value of. a public utility, the real nature of the item must
be understood: a thorough appreciation of the significance of this
term is especially needed where the discussion for and against
capitalization or amortization respectively has become so pro-
nounced.' At the outset it should be noted that the dispute as to
the miethod of handling the cost of obtaining money is in part
due to a confusing nomenclature growing out of the careless
phraseology of courts, commissions, lawyers and public utility
operzitors. What is unquestionably the cost of money has been
variously called "cost of money," "cost of financing," "broker-
age" and "discount." However, an analysis of the foregoing
terms discloses real differences between them. The "cost of
financing" is a general term and embraces two distinct elements,
(a) the mechanical cost of financing, including therein all costs
of preparing, printing, engraving, registering, and distributing
security issues, whether stock, bonds or notes as well as the cost
of recording mortgages and other necessary papers, trustees' fees
and expenses, etc., and (b) the cost of money realized from the
sale of such securities, whether such cost be incurred in the form
of direct expenses paid by the company-where securities are
sold direct by the company to the investor-or as sums paid to
'While perhaps more apposite words than "amortize" and "capitalize"
might be used here, the succinctness of these words facilitates clarity of ex-
pression and hence they will be used throughout this discussion.
466 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
bankers for their services in effecting the sale of the company's
securities. Thus it will be perceived that the "cost of money" is
not so inclusive a term as "cost of financing," that "brokerage"
is synomous with "cost of money" as the latter term has just been
defined, and that "discount" is distinctly different from any of
the foregoing items.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN COST OF MONEY OR BROKERAGE AND
DISCOUNT
In view of the fact that much of the muddled terminology
centers about brokerage and discount it is relevant to distinguish
briefly between these two terms. Discount represents the differ-
ence between the par value of the securities and the price paid
therefor by investors. Discount represents an adjustment of the
stated rate of return on securities to current yields prevailing in
the investment market at the time the security is offered to the
public. The difference between the par value of a bond and the
price paid for it by the investor represents an adjustment of
interest which, when averaged over the life of the bond-in con-
junction with the interest periodically paid by the company-gives
the investor an average yield approximating the current yield for
securities of the character in question. Thus, for example, the
utility may be able to sell to an investment banker a ten-year first
mortgage seven per cent. bond at a price which will enable the
latter to offer this bond to the public at par. In this event there
is no bond discount as the term has heretofore been defined. On
the other hand, the utility may sell a six per cent. ten-year bond
to the bankers at a price which will enable them to offer it to the
investing public at 92.8938, which represents a seven per cent.
basis when interest is paid semi-annually. In either event the
bondholder buys a security which, if he holds it until maturity,
will show him a yield of seven per cent. per annum on the money
which he has invested. In the first case, he receives seven per
cent. in each and every year, while in the second case he receives
in advance the equivalent of something over one-half of one
per cent. per annum for the entire period (representing the differ-
ence between the price which he pays for the bond, viz. 92.8938,
and par) and thereafter interest at the rate of six per cent. per
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annum upon the face amount of the bond, which is equivalent to
6.46 per cent. per annum on the cash price which he paid for the
bond. It is clear from this illustration that a corporation about
to issue securities has at least in theory the choice between the
issue of a security carrying a rate of interest sufficiently high
to enable it to be sold to the ultimate investor at par, or, on the
other hand, of issuing a security of the same characteristics,
except that its rate of interest is lower, in consequence of which
it can be sold to the ultimate investor only at a discount.
As distinguished from discount, the cost of money or broker-
age represents the difference between the price at which securities
are sold to the banker by the utility and the price at which the
banker in turn sells them to the investing public. It includes a
reasonable compensation for the banker's services in marketing
the securities and forwarding the funds yielded to the utility; the
services and expenses of examination, negotiation, advertising
and selling through all of the various stages until the sale to the
final investor is effected.
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR AMORTIZATION OF COST OF
MONEY
There are seventeen public service commissions in favor
of affiortizing the cost of money.2 Largely as the result of re-
garding brokerage and discount as connoting the same class
of costs to a public utility, some commissions view the cost of
money as "an advance payment of interest and not to be treated
as a capital investment," declaring that "it should be made up
out of income by the creation of a sinking fund reserve sufficient
to cover the item by the time the bonds mature." 3 Indeed, this
erroneous conception of the cost of money as an item synonymous
with discount not only pervades the decisions of courts and com-
missions but has been fostered by the authors of legal texts deal-
ing with the jurisprudence of public utilities, 4 by the National
= A list of the states whose commissions have decided that the cost of money
should be amortized out of operating revenues follows: Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin and Utah.
. Lincoln v. Lincoln Water & Light Co., P. U. R. I9q7, B I.
" WHITTEN: VALUATION OF PtMLIC SERVICE CORPOATIONS, p. 268.
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Association of Railway and Utilities Commissioners, 5 and, curi-
ously enough, by public accountants. Generally, the members of
the accounting profession have been very definitely against the
capitalization of brokerage charges. Reference to accounting
textbooks and the various classification of accounts adopted by
the different public service commissions shows first, an unmis-
takable tendency to treat brokerage and discount as identical
items, and, second, an almost uniform adherence to the practice
of amortizing over the life of the securities any brokerage charges
incident to their sale.6 While a misconception of the significance
of two terms meaning markedly different thing is hardly to be
considered a sound argument for amortizing the cost of money,
yet due recognition must be given to this misconception as an
outstanding cause of the fallacious treatment by many courts and
public service commissions of the cost of money as an element in
the valuation of a public utility. However, it should be recog-
nized that inasmuch as discount involves an adjustment of the
stated rate of return on securities to current yields prevailing in
the investment market and does not represent any payments made
by the utility for services rendered to it; and since the discount on
securities is applicable only to the period for which the securities
run and hence could not be capitalized without artificially inflating
the capital account, and since ordinarily the amount of this dis-
count, except in excessively speculative enterprises never reaches
large proportions--discount may well be amortized out of
operating expenses without unduly burdening the consumer of
the utility during the life of the securities and without depriving
the stockholders of any funds which they have actually contrib-
uated to the enterprise.
Certain considerations of policy have also influenced the
judgment of commissions confronted with the problem of hand-
ling the item of brokerage. Admitting that the cost of getting
money represents a legitimate part of the cost of the property,
the statement is encountered "that it is wiser to allow a rate of
'Proceedings for i92o--Appendix I, p. 30.
SHAYES: PUBLIC UTILTIES-THEM COST NEW AND DEPRcIATION-In re
Terminal Taxicab Co., P. U. R 1915, B 546; Campbell v. Hood River Gas &
Electric Co., P. U. R. 1915, D 855; Re Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co, P. U. R.
1916, F 416.
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return higher than would otherwise have been assigned and to
require that a portion of such return be turned into a fund to
amortize such losses." 7 On the other hand, certain commissions
deluded by notions of public policy maintain that the consumers
should not be burdened with a rate of return on imaginary values
representing the bond discount suffered by the utility due to the
stockholders' financial inability to furnish the needed capital for
improvements and betterments through stock subscription."
Again, some commissions refuse to permit the cost of money to
be capitalized due to the difficulties that might ensue were this
policy pursued in the case of refunding bond issues, for it is
claimed that the capitalization of the cost of money on refunding
issues would continually add sums to the total capital account of
the utility until this account might be entirely out of proportion
to the fair value of the property.9
Another reason for the insistence by legal tribunals that the
cost of money cannot be regarded as a contribution to the capital
investment of the utility is to be found in the carelessness dis-
played by the utilities themselves in the preparation and presenta-
tion of their cases. An examination of the transcripts of record
too frequently divulges the failure of the utility to base its claim
for cost of money upon the actual expenses incurred in the sale
of its securities. The failure to provide concrete evidence of such
expenditures furnishes the courts and commissions with adequate
provocation for denying the validity of the claim altogether. Thus,
in a comparatively recent decision bearing upon this question the
Supreme Court of the United States categorically refused to
recognize the cost of money as an element to be included in the
investment of a public utility property, since the evidence sub-
mitted thereon savored of being hypothetical and conjectural and
of not being positively grounded on the experience of the utility."0
While an imposing catalog of reasons resorted to by courts
and commissions in justification of amortizing the cost of money
might be adduced, it is doubtful whether such an array would
Lima v. Lima Telegraph & Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1916, E 670.
8 Re Citizens Telephone Co., P. U. R. gx9g, B 352.
'Re Wisconsin-Minesota Light & Power Co., P. U. R. i92o, D 428.
"Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, P. U. PR. 1g2, D 159, 258 U. S. 388.
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add anything of significance. A careful reading of the decisions
in which the item of brokerage has been amortized almost in-
variably discloses the fact that the tribunal has not perceived the
essential differences between brokerage and discount. As will
appear subsequently, to imply that the amortization of brokerage
lightens the rate-burden of the utility's customers is to fly in the
face of the facts. To state that the capitalization of brokerage
gives an unwarranted advantage to the utility of comparatively
weak credit by enabling it to aggrandize its investment 11 and
thus secure a differential advantage over the utility in a strong
credit position, is to. assert that the credit status of the utility
is the predominant and outstanding factor determining its cost
of money, and to ignore conditions existing in the money and
investment markets, the kind of security issued, the general repu-
tation among investors of the type of utility seeking capital, the
location of the enterprise, the extent to which the territory served
by the utility has been developed and the character and extent of
local and state regulation and control, as very positive and per-
tinent factors affecting the amount of brokerage. To amortize
the cost of money because of the possibility of duplicating the
addition of the brokerage item to the utility's total investment
whenever a refunding security is issued is to conjure an argument
out of a pretense, for the exercise of the supervisory and adminis-
trative powers over the issuance of securities by public utility cor-
porations granted to most public service commissions, would
effectively prevent any such excessive capitalization.
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF BROKERAGE
Much of the misconception concerning the cost of money
arises through a failure to appreciate the nature of the transaction
by which bankers are used as intermediaries in the distribution of
securities. It is erroneously regarded as essentially different from
a transaction by which the original owners of a public utility en-
terprise, living in the community in which the enterprise is devel-
oped, contribute the initial capital for its organization and devel-
t Reno Power, Light & Water Co. v. Public Service Commission of Nevada,
P. U. R. 1923, E 485, 298 Fed. 790 (D. C.).
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opment. Where the citizens of a community are desirous of having
a public utility supply them with electricity, water or gas, they
would immediately be confronted by the difficulties of raising suf-
ficient capital to build the plant and set it in operation. If the
money is raised by capital stock, an advertising and selling cam-
paign would be necessary to persuade the investors of the particu-
lar community to subscribe to the stock of the proposed enterprise.
If the stock were sold at par directly by the utility itself, with no
bankers or any other intermediiary serving as an agent in the
distribution of the securities to the publia except perhaps the em-
ployes of the new company, there would still be the cost of raising
money by the sale of preferred and common stock equivalent to
the total expenditures incurred in marketing the stock to the local
investors, and represented by sales commissions, advertising,
printing and stationery, transportation, postage, etc. The cost of
selling these securities locally is to be measured by the experience
of other utilities in the local distribution of their stock through
customer ownership campaigns, and will range from two to four-
teen per cent. of the net cash received by the utility. A fair
determination of the actual money invested in such a property
could hardly recognize less than the total amount of money con-
tributed by the stockholders, although the net cash per share in-
vested in tangible property would be the balance left after the
legitimate selling expenses had been deducted from par.
Essentially, there is no difference between the foregoing
situation and one where the utility hires an investment banker
whose business it is to sell securities, who has an organization
and trained staff, the technical knowledge, the banking connec-
tions and the clientele to do the thing for it. Viewing the matter
from the standpoint of cost alone, much is to be said in favor
of distributing securities through bankers. A wide and varied
experience in the sale of similar securities, the gradual develop-
ment,extending over a period of years of an established clientele,
familiarity with the current preferences and dislikes of investors,
an intimate knowledge of the availability of funds in the money
and investment markets, and the flexibility of underwriting syndi-
cates in adapting themselves to unforeseen and untoward events,
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qualify the banker to distribute securities rapidly and at a mini-
mum cost. Indeed, the figures afford substantial evidence that
enterprises lacking established earning power and operating in
comparatively undeveloped territories can frequently obtain their
funds cheaper through bankers than through direct sales to the
public.
The repeated assertion that the cost of obtaining money can
be eliminated or avoided by increasing the face interest rate of
the security to meet prevailing market conditions ignores the con-
ditions confronting corporations seeking to raise money through
the sale of securities. Arbitrarily to increase the face interest
rate of the security might avoid bond or stock discount as the
term is herein applied, but it does not warrant an assumption
that the sale and distribution of securities, whether conducted by
the utility itself or by bankers; can be prosecuted without ex-
pense. The cost of obtaining money invariably represents a legiti-
mate expenditure for services that have actually been rendered
in the sale and distribution of securities. Indeed, the attempt to
eliminate bond discount and the cost of obtaining money by rais-
ing the face interest rate of the securities in question might
actually result in the utility experiencing unwonted difficulty in
marketing its securities or in stressing the two factors which
were sought to be eliminated. The problem is one involving con-
ditions somewhat more complicated than a simple arithmetical
computation. For example, the mere fact that a utility recently
organized in a relatively new territory was attempting to market
its bonds bearing a face interest rate of eight or nine per cent.
when the current yield then prevailing in the investment market
was but seven per cent. would immediately arouse the suspicion
of investors. Investors might well look askance at a security
whose face interest rate was so far out of line with current yields
of similar securities, and might regard the attempt to dispose of
such a security as a complete confession of lack of credit on the
part of the utility or of some inherent defect in its business or
financial program. The effect would be much the same as that
produced by a merchant possessing a supposedly A-i line of credit
hawking his promissory notes bearing an interest rate of ten per
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cent. about a market where the prevailing cost of money was
only six per cent. Conservative investors seldom expect to get
something for nothing, particularly in the matter of interest
rates, and the mere offer of a security bearing a face rate of
interest disproportionately out of line with the current yields
would in all probability prove such a deterrent to prospective
purchasers as to hinder effectually the distribution of the security.
With this situation confronting either the utility or the banker, it
is evident that the amount of time and effort required to com-
plete the sale of the security will be tremenodusly enhanced-the
expenses incident to administration, sales and advertising will
undoubtedly increase--and this advanced cost of selling will be
reflected in a higher cost of obtaining money.
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALIZING COST OF MONEY
There are sound economic reasons for capitalizing the cost of
money.' 2 From the customer's viewpoint there is something to be
said in favor of the method by which the amount expended in ac-
quiring funds is added to the value of the plant upon which a fair
return is to be allowed. Even though by such a method the cost of
money becomes a permanent charge upon the customer, this
charge will be relatively low compared with that which the cus-
tomers of the first few years following the inauguration.of the
enterprise will have to bear in case the cost is written off through
operating expenses. Moreover, the amortization method of
handling the cost of money accentuates the financial burden which
the customers of the utility during the earlier years have to bear,
not alone because during this period the customers are fewer in
number, but also because it is likely that necessary changes in
plant, personnel, and services dictated by cumulative experience
with the community served, render inevitable higher rates during
the inaugural stages of the enterprise.
From the standpoint of the stockholder cogent reasons exist
for including the cost of money to a public utility corporation in
" The following public service commissions have at some time declared in
favor of adding the cost of money to the capital investment of a public utility:
District of Columbia, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Utah.
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the investment upon which a fair rate of return is to be calcu-
lated. For it must be remembered that the value of most public
utility properties is represented both by bonds and by stocks. The
bonds have prior claim on the earnings while the stockholders
take what is left after all of the preferred claims have been met.
The amount deducted from the so-called fair value of the prop-
erty in case the cost of money is written off through operating
expenses would, therefore, have to come out of the stockholder's
share alone instead of being distributed over the entire value of
the property as it should be. For the purpose of illustrating the
effect which the failure to capitalize the cost of money to a public
utility would have upon the equity of the stockholders, the cal-
culations set forth in the following table were made, the relation-
ship existing between the money raised by bonds and the money
raised by stock being predicated upon the interim report of the
Sub-committee on Electric Securities of the Investment Bankers
Association, which stated that money raised by the sale of bonds
should not exceed fifty to sixty per cent. of the total value of the
utility's property, including intangibles, and that the remainder,
representing the equity money, should consist of equal parts of
preferred stock and common stock. It is assumed that a public
utility enterprise is to be organized with a total investment of
$io,ooo,ooo, over and above the cost of obtaining that capital,
the money to be raised by the sale of bonds and stocks according
to the proportions just described. The cost-of-money figures
represent the actual cost of money on bonds or stock to public
utilities in the United States as determined by a computation
covering a nine-year period from 1914 to 1922, inclusive, embrac-
ing 6oo public utility companies of all types and involving secur-
ity issues aggregating $1,75o,ooo,ooo par value. 13 To simplify
the illustration, it has been assumed that the securities without
exception will be sold to the ultimate investor at par so that the
investor's money contribution to the physical plant of the utility
will in fact exactly equal the par value of the securities outstand-
ing in every case.
See earlier articles by the author entitled Cost of Money to Public Utili-
ties in United States, 1914 to 1922, Inclusive.-JouR. LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY
EcoNoMics, Jan., 1926.
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With the foregoing factors affecting this calculation in mind,
the amount of bonds which would have to be issued to the in-
vestors at par to yield $6,ooo,ooo in cash, as illustrated in Ex-
ample A, would be determined by the cost of money applied in
this instance, or 5.9 o per cent. In brief, the total par value of
bonds that would have to be sold to net the company $6,ooo,ooo
subsequently to -be invested in its plant, would exceed $6,ooo,ooo
by the total expenditures made in obtaining the money. This
amounts to $354,420, so that the utility would have to sell
$6,354,420 of bonds in order to receive net $6,ooo,ooo. With
preferred stock exactly the same method of calculation is applied
and the result in this case, with preferred stock money costing on
the average 8.5 per cent., shows that $2,i69,76o of preferred
stock would have to be sold to the investor at par in order to net
the company $2,oooooo. By the same process the amount of
common stock that would have to be issued with a cost of money
of twelve per cent. to net the company $2,oooooo is shown to be
$2,240,000. 14 Consequently, $10,764,18o of.securities will have
to be issued at par to the ultimate investor to yield to the com-
pany $io,oooooo to invest in its property after the cost of money
has been defrayed.
The relationship between the cost of money expressed in
dollars and the equity which the common stockholders now
possess in the $oooo,ooo property is as follows: The total cash
received by the company from the bankers is $io,ooo,ooo and the
total par value of the bonds and preferred stock outstanding, rep-
resenting dollar for dollar the money contributed by the ultimate
investor, is $8,524,18o. The balance, representing the equity for
the common stock, assuming that no allowance is made for the
cost of money in any valuation of the public utility's property
immediately following the construction of the property, amounts
to $1,475,820. While the common stockholder has paid
1 1 It is believed that allowances of 12 and 15 per cent. for the cost of obtain-
ing money through the sale of common stock is not excessive, especially in view
of the fact that in a decision of the New Hampshire Public Service Commission
an allowance of $io a share to a banking house for selling a 7 per cent. preferred
stock at par was held to be reasonable. Re Utilities Power Company, P. U. R.
1923, A p. 338.
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$2,24o,ooo in cash for this stock, yet if the cost of this money
is excluded from the total value of the utility's property, then
the equity in the property, representing the allowed part of the
rate base belonging to the stockholder, would amount to $764,18o
less than the actual amount of money which he has contributed
to the enterprise. If the cost of money is not regarded as an
element of value in the public utility's property, approximately
34.12 per cent. of the common stock equity has immediately dis-
appeared. In brief, the percentage of par value of the common
stock not represented by an allowed value, when the cost of
money is excluded from the investment value of a utility's prop-
erty, ranges from thirty to thirty-five per cent.
It is to be noted particularly that the basis of all of the fore-
going calculations with the exception of common stock, is the
actual cost of money as revealed in the investigation previously
referred to.
The preceding calculation definitely demonstrates that the
cost of money is something which the security holders have gener-
ally contributed to the enterprises. The need for recognizing
cost of money as an essential part of the value of any public
utility enterprise is further accentuated by the fact that utilities
are continually seeking to attract capital with which to finance
the improvements and extensions demanded by their customers.
Should stockholders find that through the arbitrary refusal of
public service commissions and the courts to recognize legitimate
expenditures incurred in obtaining money for the utility as a part
of the money invested in the property, thirty-five per cent. of
their investment disappears immediately after the purchase of
their stock, then the keystone in the structure of finance, repre-
senting the investment in common stock, becomes practically
impossible. No investor is likely to invest in a business enter-
prise where his profits are not only regulated, but where at the
outset he must face a loss of thirty-five per cent. of his invest-
ment because the regulatory bodies have decided that the cost of
money must be amortized through operating expenses rather than
be added to the property investment.
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The soundness of the reasoning by which public utility com-
missions justify the amortization of the cost of money out of
operating expenses and refuse to permit it to be included in the
investment in the property diminishes when it is realized that one
of the standard measures adopted by commissions for determin-
ing a fair rate of return sufficient to attract capital into the indus-
try is the cost of money, or, as it is generally phrased, "the cost
of attracting capital," in the open market. In the mechanics
of fixing rates for public utility enterprises, the value of the prop-
erty is generally regarded as constituting the base upon which
the rates are to be fixed-this value representing a finding by
some government tribunal that there has been and is as of the
date of the valuation a certain amount of money invested in the
property that is used and useful and dedicated to the public serv-
ice. A fair rate of return is the interest which when applied to
the money invested in the property produces the return which, in
the judgment of the regulatory body and the owners of the prop-
erty, including its creditors or bondholders, it should be allowed
to earn. The rate of return measures the sum which the public
utility is allowed to collect from the public for the service ren-
dered. The purpose of determining the fair value of a public
utility is to give to the security holder and particularly to the
owners of the property, namely preferred and common stock-
holders, some estimate of the actual money investment in back of
their security. As a matter of fact, the reputable investment
banker is extremely careful before he sells any utility bonds or
stock to his customers to ascertain whether there is a dollar-for-
dollar investment value in back of the securities marketed, for
he realizes the precariousness of his position if he is detected
selling securities which will not at all times be recognized as hav-
ing a right to a return. It is sheer casuistry to say that the amor-
tization of the cost of money adequately protects the investment
of the bondholder and stockholder. Unfortunately under our
capitalistic regime the investor or owner measures the adequacy
of his protection by whether or not he has returned to him at
the maturity of his investment the same dollars of purchasing
power that he has originally contributed to the enterprise. Blandly
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to assure him at the outset that having paid so much money for
his bonds or stock his investment will shrink from thirty
to thirty-five per cent. due to the failure of the public service com-
mission or courts to recognize the legitimacy of including the cost
of obtaining money in the total investment, is a method par
excellence for keeping capital out of the industry.
While bearing traces of confusion between brokerage and
discount, the practical necessity of allowing the cost of money to
be capitalized is enunciated in the leading decision 1 5 in Pennsyl-
vania, in which Judge Kephart laid down the fundamental prin-
ciples of valuation, which have since been repeatedly affirmed:
"Concerning the item of brokerage, . . . utilities,
like other companies, are not able to make their financial
arrangements without allowing such discount. The differ-
ence between the amounts derived from the sales of its bonds
and the amount which the company must eventually pay on
the bonds has been regarded as a part of capital charge for
construction. While corporations should not be permitted
to capitalize their lack of credit, still, where bonds are sold
at a reasonable discount and bear a fair rate of interest, such
discount should be allowed. What is a fair discount depends
upon the condition of the money market and the ability of
the organizers to attract capital to the project. It is a well-
known fact that the great majority of companies are started
without all the available cash necessary to complete the
undertaking. This country would not have reached its great
stage of industrial development if it had been the rule that
all capital must be procured in advance by full-paid stock
subscriptions. If a legal rate of return was all that was
offered, the investor could very well answer that, without
risk and with a safe margin of value, money could be loaned
on lands and buildings at this rate of return. When
solicited to invest in a new project, with the uncertainty of
success before him, the investor demands a return commen-
surate with the risk involved, and that must be something
more than a legal-rate investment. If the venture is a fail-
ure, the investor is compelled to take his loss without any
Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co., P. U. R. i9i8, A 161, 68 Pa. Super.
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hope of recoupment; but it is equally unfair to require him
to suffer all the loss if the enterprise fails, and to deprive
him of the chance of additional gain if the venture is a
successful one. Moreover, the company should be allowed
the expense necessary to give a reasonable discount on bonds
and . . such discount should be allowed as a capital
charge. To hold that only the cash received may be con-
sidered in a rate-making value would not only deprive the
company of property, but would deprive the investor of
property; it would drive from the field of legitimate banking
the securities of hundreds of utility companies within the
state. Many of these securities are held in good faith by
banks throughout the commonwealth. We cannot view the
present success of utility companies as the medium through
which this question must be judged. It is necessary to go
back to ,their formative period, when these securities were
sold, and from that viewpoint examine the various critical
stages through which the utility company has passed. It
has only been through inventive genius that any utility con-
cerns have become successful ventures. The appellant should
be allowed a certain per cent. for brokerage or discount.
There was sufficient evidence before the Commission to
determine the fair amount, and while the Company, in
undertaking to allow exorbitant amounts, fell into error, and
such issues were clearly unreasonable and grossly in excess
of any fair demand, still we cannot deny to the innocent
stock and bond holder the justice of securing a reasonable
allowance for brokerage as a capital charge."
Upon appeal this case was taken to the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania and the decision of the Superior Court was upheld
on this point. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 16 went so far
as to say that the inability to show the actual expenses incurred
in the sale of bonds afforded no adequate reason for excluding
this item in the determination of the fair value of the property,
since "Common experience shows, however, the bonds could not
have been marketed without paying brokerage either to the per-
son who sold them, or by reduction from par value on their sale
to a purchaser, or both." That the stress laid by the Pennsylvania
"Ben Avon v. Ohio Valley Water Co., P. U. R. I921, E 471, 271 Pa. 346,
HX4 Atl. 369.
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Supreme Court upon the justice of capitalizing cost of obtaining
money is based upon the practical experience of public utility
properties is shown in the following excerpt from its opinion:
"The last of the five questions is whether or not broker-
age on the sale of bonds of the water company should have
been allowed? The Commission says that sufficient evi-
dence of actual payment thereof was not produced, but
everybody knows that expenses are necessarily incurred in
such sales; even our Victory and Liberty Bonds could not
be marketed except at a very heavy cost. There is no legal
principle standing in the way of making a proper allowance
therefor, and it is difficult to understand the basis of the
mistake of those who hold it should not be allowed. The
matter is in the same situation as if it had placed its bonds
in the hands of an agent, with direction to sell them and
apply the proceeds, as needed, for construction expenses.
These bonds were all that the water company had to apply
in payment of the plant, and the use thereof for this pur-
pose, in the final analysis, constituted simply an exchange
of one for the other. If it had been remembered that money
itself has no value except that given to it by reason of the
fact that other commodities can be obtained in exchange
for it, the error of refusing to allow this as a principal ex-
pense would probably not have been made.
"In the instant case the evidence would seem to justify
the conclusion that expenses were paid in selling the bonds,
but neither the exact purpose of the payments nor the amount
thereof clearly appears. Common experience shows, how-
ever, the bonds could not have been marketed without paying
brokerage either to the person who sold them, or by reduc-
tion from par value on their sale to a purchaser, or both;
especially in the case of an investment, somewhat prob-
lematical as to safety, as was the fact with regard to all
these utilities in the beginning."
It is submitted that the question of whether the cost of
obtaining money is being amortized by the company is im-
material in determining whether the cost of money should be in-
cluded as an item in the fair value of the property. If the
principle is adhered to that anything which is amortized should
be excluded from the valuation, the entire theory upon which
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valuations are universally made would be so greatly impaired as
to cause their abandonment as a means of determining the fair
value of the property of a public utility. It is universally ad-
mitted that interest during construction is an element of the cost
of the property and should be included as a part of its fair value.
It is also universally admitted that engineering is a proper ele-
ment in the cost of constructing a property and should be included
as a part of its value. But both interest during construction and
engineering-together with other elements of cost of a similar
nature-are amortized over the life of the various elements of
property, in which these items represent a part of the cost,
through a reserve for renewals and replacements, sometimes
referred to as a reserve for depreciation. The capital which is
raised for the purchase of labor and materials, of providing
engineering and meeting interest during construction, all passes
out of existence with the physical property. In exactly the same
way the corporate organization of most enterprises ceases at
some time to be suitable for the conditions then existing. The
utility outgrows its financial structure and extensive refinancing
is, therefore, necessary. This is an element of obsolescence ex-
actly similar in nature to the obsolescence of physical property
and must be so regarded.
It requires no minute scrutiny to ascertain the fact that the
amount of money expended by a utility in obtaining capital
funds is nothing more than a remuneration paid to the bankers
for their specialized services. The cost of money, therefore, is
directly comparable to the sum paid indirectly to wholesalers,
retailers and manufacturers in the purchase of tangible property
and equipment, for in every item of physical property bought by
a utility, a certain amount of the total purchase price goes
toward defraying the costs of sale and distribution thereof, and
hence represents specific payments to the individuals or corpora-
tions performing such services. To deny the validity of includ-
ing the cost of money-representing as it does a legitimate item
of expenditure incurred in getting requisite funds-as a proper
and indispensable element in the cost of constructing and develop-
ing every public utility property, is equivalent to a denial that
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the purchase price paid for tangible property and equipment
represents the true original value of the physical property invest-
ment. Money used for plant construction and expansion is a
commodity and must be bid for in a competitive market, and the
time and energy incident to its acquisition and placement in the
hands of the utility should be duly compensated. Actual expendi-
tures made by certain utilities in selling their securities directly
to the public averages approximately 4.5 per cent of the net cash
received by the utility. Consequently, when a local investor
buys a share of stock at par paying $ioo therefor, it means that
of this total sum $4.5o on the average has been spent in getting
his $ioo, and the remaining $95.50 has been honestly and prud-
ently expended in the property. After this cost of ottaining
money has been defrayed, there would be little question in any-
one's mind that the total value of the property was the par value
of the stock which has been paid in by the local investor. As
previously suggested, there is no essential difference between this
situation and one where the utility hires an investment banker
whose business it is to sell securities to do the thing for it. In
both instances the utility is compelled to pay the cost of obtain-
ing money, and there is no justification for regarding the inter-
vention of investment bankers between the utility and the invest-
ing public as a reason for declining to include the amount of
money expended in obtaining capital funds as a part of the fair
value of the property.
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